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The Logic of Defence Assistance to Ukraine 
A Strategic Assessment 
Dumitru Minzarari and Susan Stewart 
The recent debate about providing military assistance to Ukraine has relevance for 
the efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Minsk Process and the Normandy 
Format in particular, and thus the search for a resolution to the conflict regarding 
the Donbas. But it also concerns larger questions of Germany’s role in Europe, and in 
security policy more generally. It touches on Germany’s ability to adapt to situations 
in which other countries are willing to envisage military solutions to existing con-
flicts. In this sense, it fits into discussions about a more geopolitical EU. And it offers 
Berlin a way to reinforce its commitment to European security and stability by more 
actively resisting the redrawing of international borders. 
 
The question of providing military assis-
tance to actors in crisis zones has consist-
ently been a difficult one for German poli-
ticians and policymakers. However, with 
rising expectations both inside and outside 
the country for Germany to play a more 
robust role in the international arena, this 
and related questions are likely to arise 
more insistently with regard to future con-
flicts. Thus, the recent debate on sending 
military assistance to Ukraine should be 
seen not only as a sign of the Bundestag 
election campaign heating up, but also as 
an indication that this topic is going to 
remain on the political agenda. The case 
of Ukraine points to a set of issues related 
to Germany’s foreign policy role more 
broadly conceived, and to Berlin’s potential 
contribution to European security. 
Germany’s Approach to 
Ukraine’s Security 
War between Russia and its proxies in the 
Donbas on the one hand, and Ukraine on 
the other, has been ongoing since 2014. 
During that time, Germany has made a 
variety of contributions to Ukraine’s secu-
rity. The most visible one is its participation 
in the Normandy Format, in which Ger-
many and France attempt to manage and 
promote solutions to the ongoing conflict 
in the Donbas. Berlin has also provided 
important input in the Trilateral Contact 
Group, which is another component of 
the “Minsk Process” that is responsible for 
agreeing upon concrete measures of con-
flict regulation and management. Further-
more, Germany has offered medical treat-
ment to some of those seriously wounded 
in the war and has contributed personnel 
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to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in 
the Donbas, and in Ukraine more broadly. 
It has also made financial and other types 
of assistance available to improve the 
situation in those parts of the Donbas still 
under Ukrainian control. 
However, it has been German policy 
not to provide defence assistance to Ukraine 
for a variety of reasons. Beyond a strong 
pacifist streak in German politics and 
society, these reasons have focused on the 
potential negative consequences for the 
development of the conflict. In particular, 
there has been concern that injecting more 
weapons and other military equipment into 
an ongoing conflict situation would cause 
the conflict to escalate. German policy has 
primarily emphasised de-escalation as well 
as efforts to identify a political solution. 
The approach has been premised on in-
creasing the number and effectiveness of 
the political, economic, and humanitarian 
mechanisms brought to bear on the situa-
tion, while leaving the military component 
largely unaddressed. This has essentially 
coincided with the EU approach, although 
individual member states, in particular 
Lithuania, have provided some military 
assistance to Ukraine bilaterally. Outside 
the EU, the US has been the most substan-
tial provider of such assistance, although 
the UK and Canada have also been active in 
this respect. If Germany were to join these 
countries in assisting Ukraine in the realm 
of defence, it would make sense to coordi-
nate with them, as well as with Kyiv, on 
the types of assistance that could be most 
useful. But this issue is secondary to the 
question of whether or not to offer such 
assistance in the first place. 
The Role of Defence Assistance 
Insights from the field of strategic analysis 
reveal that military assistance can in fact 
be utilised for de-escalation purposes. In 
particular, crisis bargaining and deterrence-
related studies suggest that visible capabili-
ties for denial-based deterrence are the 
most reliable option for discouraging delib-
erate armed escalations. Given Ukraine’s 
conflict conditions, this means that the 
most likely outcomes of increased military 
assistance to Ukraine would be a reduction 
in the level of armed violence and a height-
ened probability of peaceful negotiations. 
In Russia’s foreign policy toolkit, war 
represents a valid alternative to other types 
of policy. In other words, the Russian mili-
tary is viewed as just another national 
resource that can be used to acquire desired 
goods. As do numerous states, Russia 
switches between its persuasive (trade and 
diplomacy) and its coercive (military) tools, 
depending on which is more cost-effective 
in a given case. 
In 2014 Russia switched to the military 
tool in the case of Ukraine, in the attempt 
to ensure the compliance of Ukraine with 
Russia’s designs for the region. This hap-
pened because Russian leaders believed that 
the military instrument would be more effi-
cient than diplomatic talks. Russia’s mili-
tary build-up in March and April of this 
year indicates that this is still the way they 
view the conflict. However, if this tool 
achieves less than expected, while the 
military resources invested degrade more 
quickly, the Russian leadership could be 
induced to reconsider and switch back to 
peaceful talks. One way to make the Rus-
sian military tool less effective and less 
attractive would be by strengthening 
Ukraine’s military. This approach appears 
feasible since previous Russian foreign and 
security behaviour indicates that Russia 
is not currently contemplating a full-scale 
invasion of Ukraine. 
By acquiring additional defence assis-
tance, a militarily stronger Ukraine can 
impose more significant costs on Russia 
while on the defensive, but it cannot win 
against Russia in an offensive operation. Its 
military capabilities are not adequate for 
this – Ukraine could hardly deploy more 
than 60,000–80,000 troops in the Donbas, 
at the risk of significantly weakening its 
defences in other areas, including on the 
border with Belarus. Russia, on the other 
hand, can afford to amass at its borders 
with Ukraine a force about twice as large. 
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It revealed this in April 2021, when it 
deployed more than 100,000 troops in the 
proximity of Ukraine’s borders, in addition 
to the fighting force already deployed in 
the Donbas. This estimation also considers 
Russia’s constraints, which are related to 
the structure of its armed forces, and the 
necessity to cover its very extensive borders. 
Ukraine thus has no chance to succeed 
in – and therefore no incentive for – a 
military offensive against Russia. Ukraine is 
capable of defeating Russian proxies in the 
Donbas alone, as it proved in August 2014. 
However, it will presumably refrain from 
attacking, since the Ukrainian army is 
aware that Russia could always intervene – 
as it did in 2014, when it sent its military 
across the border and defeated advancing 
Ukrainian troops. Both the 2008 Russian-
Georgian War and Ukraine’s own experi-
ence with Russia in the Donbas sent a 
strong signal to Ukrainian policymakers 
that Russia will respond militarily to an 
attempted offensive against its proxies. 
On the other hand, a militarily stronger 
Ukraine can affect the attractiveness of an 
armed escalation in the Donbas for Russia. 
With modern Western equipment, logistics, 
and training, it can significantly alter the 
cost calculations and incentives of the Rus-
sian military. Evidence shows that even a 
technologically and numerically inferior 
fighting force can pose a challenge if it 
skilfully uses the modern system of force 
employment. Combining this system with 
Western military equipment, Ukrainian 
forces can inflict higher levels of damage 
on troops attacking them, more quickly 
degrading their deployed military capabili-
ties. This should encourage longer cease-
fires, at least. For instance, one of the 
longest ceasefires in Eastern Ukraine, 
agreed in summer 2020, came shortly after 
the US permitted Ukraine to use the Javelin 
anti-tank missiles it had provided, under 
the condition that they were to be used 
only in response to attacks in the Donbas. 
A second-tier effect of defence assistance 
is that a better-equipped Ukraine would 
also considerably reduce its own losses from 
Russian attacks, diminishing their utility. 
For instance, the combat first-aid kits and 
other medical supplies that Ukraine re-
quested but failed to receive from Germany 
in 2014 could have significantly reduced 
the almost 40 per cent death rate among 
wounded soldiers, preserving higher defen-
sive capabilities on the Ukrainian side. 
Similarly, improved individual protection 
equipment for soldiers, such as body 
armour vests and Kevlar helmets, would 
also save the lives of many Ukrainian 
combatants, contributing to a higher cost-
benefit ratio of Russian military operations. 
Furthermore, secure radio capabilities, bet-
ter reconnaissance equipment, and night-
vision devices that Ukraine previously 
requested could further improve the ability 
of the Ukrainian military to reduce its per-
sonnel losses. 
Some of the highest Ukrainian casualties 
have come as a result of artillery and sniper 
fire. Improving the counter-fire capabilities 
of the Ukrainian military by delivering sur-
veillance and target acquisition equipment 
would change this drastically. This and 
other types of defence assistance have the 
dual effect of reducing Ukrainian losses and 
increasing costs for the Russian military 
by forcing them to expend more munitions 
and lose more hardware. The continuous 
replenishment of Russian supplies of muni-
tions and military hardware over the last 
seven years has not been cheap. And if Rus-
sia starts to lose that hardware more fre-
quently, while its strikes inflict less damage 
on Ukrainian troops, then the military 
escalation becomes more costly and delivers 
fewer benefits. 
A Better Chance for Diplomacy 
Increasing the defence capabilities of 
Ukraine would not only reduce its losses, 
but also improve its resolve and signal that 
resolve more powerfully to Russia. This 
could play a strong role in deterring further 
escalation and move the conflict from the 
violent stage to diplomatic talks by affect-
ing both Russia’s perception of Ukraine’s 
determination to continue fighting and its 
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expectations about the conflict’s duration 
and gains. Defence assistance to Ukraine 
challenges Russia’s expectations of Ukraine’s 
propensity to capitulate and accept Russia’s 
conditions regarding the Donbas. As Russian 
leaders become aware of Ukraine’s increased 
resolve and its more resilient defence pos-
ture, they will adjust their expectations and 
have less confidence in Ukraine’s potential 
capitulation. This could have a critical im-
pact on the crisis bargaining process, in the 
sense of positively affecting Russia’s willing-
ness to negotiate in earnest. 
Thus, by providing defence assistance to 
Kyiv, Germany – in conjunction with other 
states already active in this regard – would 
temper Russia’s decision to escalate by 
influencing Russia’s expectations about 
Ukraine’s resolve to resist. If Moscow per-
ceives Ukraine to be weak and irresolute, 
then it has an incentive to keep pressure 
high by mounting continuous attacks and 
skirmishes against Ukrainian troops for a 
constant attrition effect. In the perception 
of Russian defence planners – based on 
the influence operations they have been 
running against Ukraine – this approach 
generates continuous news about casual-
ties, heightens war fatigue amongst the 
population, and puts political pressure 
on the leadership. Since Russia perceives 
Ukraine as weak, it orchestrates continuous 
ceasefire violations and instrumentalises 
their impact, aiming to erode the Ukrainian 
population’s desire to resist. 
More active German involvement would 
not just significantly benefit the peace pro-
cess and make armed escalations costlier. 
It could also further affect Russia’s expec-
tations regarding the ability of Ukraine to 
secure the support of critical players inside 
the EU. Berlin would thereby acquire a 
more solid position to negotiate with Mos-
cow. Currently, Russia strongly influences 
the negotiations and their agenda, exploit-
ing its Donbas proxies to absorb the costs 
of its noncompliance with the Minsk agree-
ments, thus making its violations easy to 
sustain. 
By assuming a substantive role – along 
with other Western states – in consolidat-
ing Ukraine’s defence and resolve against 
military attacks in the Donbas, Germany 
would be able to strengthen its bargaining 
leverage on Russia due its ability to directly 
impact Russia’s interests and activities in 
its priority geographic area. By providing 
defence assistance to Ukraine, Germany 
would progressively create for itself a wider 
space for a trade-off with Russia. It could 
achieve this by conceding to adjust this 
assistance in the future, although maintain-
ing it at a level sufficient to ensure Ukraine’s 
effective deterrence ability, thus promoting 
a bargaining process on the Donbas that 
discourages armed escalations. This ability 
to impact facts on the ground would force 
Russia to seek to engage Germany, not only 
in the economic sphere, but in the security 
domain as well. 
If Germany wants to play a prominent 
pacifying role in Eastern Ukraine, it needs 
to reshape Russia’s perception that it 
can easily coerce Ukraine into submission 
through a gradual military attrition of 
Ukraine’s defence capabilities and its 
resolve. Otherwise, the conflict is likely 
to linger for decades, leading to thousands 
of additional casualties and a higher risk 
of military escalation, since Ukraine is un-
willing to become a satellite state of Russia. 
In parallel with this strategy, Germany 
could contribute to the peace process by 
negotiating with Russia and providing an 
“honourable way out” of the Donbas war, 
making such a retreat more palatable for 
Moscow. A peaceful solution to the ongoing 
Russian-Ukrainian War in the Donbas that 
does not involve significantly raising the 
costs of Russian military activity seems un-
likely. Altering Russia’s cost calculations 
is, however, a gradual process, requiring a 
continuity of approach with regard to inter-
national support for the Ukrainian armed 
forces. 
Insights for German Foreign Policy 
A willingness to provide military assistance 
to Ukraine would thus address multiple 
issues simultaneously. It would serve as a 
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proactive response to the current stalemate 
in the Minsk Process, in which Russia has 
demonstrated inflexibility despite various 
Ukrainian proposals on how to move for-
ward. This would be an important signal to 
Moscow and Berlin’s allies that Germany is 
willing to continue to take a certain share 
of ongoing European responsibility for 
managing the conflict in the Donbas – in 
a situation where Ukraine and other actors 
are increasingly placing greater hopes on 
the US administration. Increased US in-
volvement would leave Germany and other 
European actors with less ability to influ-
ence the process in Ukraine. Germany’s 
assistance would also signal to Moscow that 
Berlin is unwilling to contemplate trading 
long-term European security for short-term 
economic benefits. Currently, some Russian 
officials tend to believe that the opposite is 
true, namely that Germany and other EU 
countries are unlikely to persist in jeopard-
ising common economic interests for an 
extended period. This perception embold-
ens Russia’s security policy abroad. Finally, 
Germany would be demonstrating strategic 
solidarity with EU and NATO member states 
that have been providing defence assistance 
to Ukraine. 
Such assistance would not violate Ger-
many’s obligations under international 
agreements. There are no restrictions on 
military assistance to Ukraine according to 
the Arms Trade Treaty, which Germany is 
a party to. More specifically, there is no UN 
Security Council prohibition of arms ex-
ports to Ukraine, and there is no evidence 
that the arms exported to Ukraine are to be 
used to violate international law. In fact, 
in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
Ukraine has the right to use arms for self-
defence, and there is abundant evidence 
that Russia used its regular military forces 
directly and as local proxies to attack 
Ukraine. 
More generally, military assistance 
would be evidence of a more strategic ap-
proach to European security, demonstrating 
German willingness to expand the arsenal 
of instruments it employs in the current 
challenging international environment. It 
would represent an effective reaction to a 
situation in which other actors (in this case 
Moscow) are pursuing a military solution. 
It would also make a political solution to 
the conflict more probable by increasing 
the likelihood that Moscow will be willing 
to engage in serious and genuine negotia-
tions. Finally, it would constitute a clear 
response to Russia’s military build-up in 
and near Ukraine in March and April, 
which has only partially been reversed. This 
build-up plainly indicated Moscow’s inten-
tion to continue relying on military instru-
ments to intimidate weaker actors and co-
erce them to accept its will. This approach 
by Russia has already led to borders in 
Europe being de facto redrawn. Reducing 
the incentives for – and the potential im-
pact of – Russia’s military instruments 
by offering defence assistance to Ukraine 
would not only raise the chances for a sus-
tainable de-escalation. It would also pro-
vide a further tangible sign that Germany 
refuses to accept the redrawing of borders 
in Europe and the subordination of smaller 
states with fewer resources to larger and 
militarily more powerful ones. 
Dr Dumitru Minzarari is Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. 
Dr Susan Stewart is Acting Head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. 
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